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full effect as an agreement for "general peace. '28 Applying the test of "fairness"
and "knowledge" to the present case the court denied summary judgment. In
essence the court's holding insures that the plaintiff, in this type of case, will
have access to the jury on the issue of the parties' intent.
The court's approach to the problem of inequitable release agreements in
the. personal injury field seems deficient. If a plaintiff is mistaken as to the ex-
tent of injuries a release is a bar.24 However, the plaintiff may be just as mis-
taken about what he bargained for as in the "unknown injury" situation. More
importantly, the result may be just as inequitable where there is only a mis-
take about the extent of injury. In the present case the court was directly
confronted with the possibility of an unjust decision based merely upon classi-
fication of the plaintiff's injuries. Therefore, it is suggested that the court's
"known-unknown" dichotomy is not conducive to just decisions in the personal
injury field. The court must have been aware of the possibility that a contrary
decision would have left the minor plaintiff without adequate compensation for
her injuries. Fortunately, an equitable decision was reached but at the price of
an intensive struggle by the court to refine an inappropriate classification
scheme of types of injuries. There is no imperative need to adhere to it. Per-
sonal injury settlements are based upon an assumption of the existence of a
state of facts, namely the condition of the plaintiff. If the parties' views of
these essential facts are incorrect, then they are mistaken as to what they have
bargained about. Under this simplified contract approach general releases
should be rescinded whenever an injured party experiences further complications
which are discovered after settlement that if not compensated for, would result
in a grossly inequitable situation. This would enable the courts to deal directly
and openly with this problem and to abandon a classification scheme which
may lead to inequitable decisions.
VICTOR OLIVERI
SELECTIVE SERVICE LAW-IN PROVnING FOR CONSCIENTIOUS On-
jECTOR EXEmPTION, FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION CLAUSE OF FIRST AMEND-
MENT PRECLUDES DISCmMNATON IN FAVOR OF THOSE WITH FORMAL
RELIGIOUS BELIEFS
On April 17, 1968, John Sisson, Jr., in obedience to an order from his local
Board, reported to the Boston, Massachusetts induction center for induction
into the armed forces. After being warned of the consequences by the officer-in-
charge, Sisson deliberately refused to be inducted. Since his objections were
based upon convictions of general morality and conscience, Sisson did not claim
in any formal sense to be a religious conscientious objector. Additionally, Sisson
23. 280 N.Y. 1 (.1939).
24. Moyer v. Scholz, 22 A.D. 50, 25-3 N.Y.S.2d 483 (3d Dep't 1964).
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did not claim to be opposed to participation in war in any form, but was.
specifically opposed to American involvement in Vietnam. At trial, a jury sitting
in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts found
Sisson guilty of a violation of section 12 of the Military Selective Service Act
of 19671 for unlawfully, knowingly, and wilfully having refused to comply with
the order of his draft board to submit to induction into the armed forces. Dur-
ing subsequent proceedings on a motion in arrest of judgment, pursuant to
Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the trial court focused on
two issues: whether conscientious objectors may be compelled to perform
combat service, and whether the 1967 Selective Service Act unconstitutionally
discriminated in favor of religious conscientious objectors to the prejudice
of Sisson. The court held, first, because of a lack of national need for combat
service from Sisson, the free exercise of religion clause of the first amendment'
and the due process clause of the fifth amendment prohibit the application of
the 1967 Selective Service Act to require Sisson to render combat service in
Vietnam, and second, the statute is invalid because Congress, in providing draft
exemption for religious conscientious objectors only, unconstitutionally dis-
criminated against those who are motivated against war by profound non-
religious beliefs. United States v. Sisson, 297 F. Supp. 902 (D. Mass. 1969),
prob. juris. noted, -U.S. -, 90 S. Ct. 92 (1969).
"The constitutional power of Congress to raise and support armies and to
make all laws necessary and proper to that end is broad and sweeping."'2 As
such, "the power of Congress to classify and conscript manpower for military
service is beyond question."3 Contentions that this power may be utilized only
in time of national emergency have been rejected by the courts under the
rationale that "the Congressional power to provide for the draft does not depend
upon the existence of a war or national emergency, but stems also from the
Constitutional power to raise and support armies and to provide and maintain
a navy."'4 By this reasoning, the power of Congress to conscript for peace time,
as well as for war time, service has been upheld.d Furthermore, Congress may
delegate its power to conscript individuals for limited service during peace time
1. 50 U.S.C. § 451, et seq. (1964). Section 12 (Title 50 U.S.CA. § 462) provides in
pertinent part:
Any . . . person ...who in any manner shall knowingly fail or neglect or
refuse to perform any duty required of him under or in the execution of this title
.. or rules, regulations, or directions made pursuant to this title .. .shall,
upon conviction in any district court of the United States of competent jurisdiction,
be punished by imprisonment for not more than five years or a fine of not more
than $10,000, or both such fine and imprisonment.
2. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). See also Lichter v. United States,
334 U.S. 742, 755-58 (1948).
3. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
4. United States v. Hogans, 369 F.2d 359, 360 (2d Cir. 1966).
5. Bertelsen v. Cooney, 213 F.2d 275 (5th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 856. See
also Etchevery v. United States, 320 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 930(1963). Accord, Memorandum Opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart in Holmes v. United States,
391 U.S. 936 (1968).
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to the President.6 Nonetheless, there may be some limitation upon the applica-
tion of this power during peace time conditions. Whether or not an individual
may be compelled in the absence of a declaration of war to render military
service in armed international conflict overseas is thought by some to be an
open constitutional question.7
It is believed by many that the power to conscript also includes the power
to exempt from conscription, and Congress has exempted conscientious objectors
from service in the armed forces since the enactment of the first conscription
legislation.8 Although some have argued that the exemption has been provided
in response to a constitutional requirement,9 the courts have consistently main-
tained the position that the conscientious objector exemption derives from
Congress and not from any constitutional mandate. Speaking on this issue, the
Supreme Court has clearly indicated that the privilege to avoid combatant
service comes from Congress, and that "that body may grant or withhold the
exemption as in its wisdom it sees fit."' 0
The present conscientious objector exemption provisions are to be found
in section 6(j) of the Military Selective Service Act of 1967." This section
exempts from combat training and service in the Armed Forces individuals
6. Section 4(a) of the Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C. § 454(a)
(1964), provides in pertinent part:
[Tjhe President is authorized, from time to time, whether or not a state of war
exists, to select and induct into the Armed Forces of the United States for training
and service in the manner provided in this title . . . such number of persons as
may be required to provide and maintain the strength of the Armed Forces.
7. Holmes v. United States, 391 US. 936 (1968) ; Hart v. United States, 391 U.S. 956(1968); McArthur v. United States, 393 U.S. 1002 (1968).
8. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 169-73 (1965).
9. Note, The Conscientious Objector and the First Amendment: There But For the
Grace of God . . . , 34 U. Cmr. L. REv. 79 (1966) ; Macgill, Selective Conscientious Objection:
Divine Will and Legislative Grace, 54 VA. L. Rav. 1355 (1968).
10. United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 623 (1931). See also Korte v. United
States, 260 F.2d 633, 635 (9th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 928 (1958); George v.
United States, 196 F.2d 445, 451 (9th Cir. 1952) ; Local Draft Board No. 1 v. Connors, 124
F.2d 388 (9th Cir. 1941).
11. 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (1964). This section provides:
Nothing contained in this title . . . shall be construed to require any person to be
subject to combatant training and service in the armed forces of the United States
who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to par-
ticipation in war in any form. As used in this section, the term "religious training
and belief" does not include essentially political, sociological, or philosophical
views, or a merely personal moral code. Any person claiming exemption from
combatant training and service because of such conscientious objection, whose
claim is sustained by the local board shall, if he is inducted into the armed forces
under this title, . . . be assigned to noncombatant service as defined by the Presi-
dent, or shall, if he is found to be conscientiously opposed to participation in such
noncombatant service, in lieu of such induction, be ordered by his local board,
subject to such regulations as the President may prescribe, to perform for a
period equal to the period prescribed in section 4(b) (section 454(b) of this
Appendix) such civilian work contributing to the maintenance of the national
health, safety, or interest as the local board pursuant to Presidential regulations
may deem appropriate and any such person who knowingly fails or neglects to
obey any such order from his local board shall be deemed, for the purposes of
section 12 of this title (section 462 of this Appendix) to have knowingly failed or
neglected to perform a duty required of him under this title ....
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who are opposed to participation in war in any form by reason of their religious
training and belief. These provisions evolved from similar provisions provided
by Congress in the 194012 and 19483s series of draft acts. To gain conscientious
objector exemption under the 1940 draft act, it was required that the regis-
trant's anti-war convictions be strictly based upon religious training and belief.
14
Subsequent court decisions excluded conscientious objection based upon philo-
sophical, social or political policy from the exemption provisions of this act.' 5
In order to effectuate the spirit and intent of the provisions of section 6(j), the
President has promulgated regulations establishing individual classifications for
conscientious objection to combatant and non-combatant service.1 6
The constitutionality of the exemption provisions has come under varied
and continuous attack. The Act of 191717 allowed conscientious objector status
only to members of pacifist religious sects, and the Supreme Court upheld this
classification despite the argument that it violated the "free exercise of religion"
provision of the first amendment. 8 Nevertheless, "in adopting the 1940 Selec-
tive Training and Service Act Congress broadened the exemption afforded in
the 1917 Act by making it unnecessary to belong to a pacifist religious
sect .... "19 Section 5(g) of the 1940 Act and the similar provisions found in
section 6(j) of the 1948 and 1967 Acts have consistently been held to be
constitutional in the same manner as were the corresponding provisions of the
1917 Act.2 0 The courts have rejected contentions that the provisions impose a
religious test for a public office, 2 ' that the law shows a preference of one religion
over another,2 2 and that the Act is a law respecting an establishment of
religion.23
The courts have shown a marked unwillingness to defy the will of Congress
in this area. In United States v. Kurki,2 4 for example, the Court refused to pro-
vide a conscientious objection exemption to a selective conscientious objector
12. Act of September 16, 1940, 54 Stat. 885, 889, § 5(g).
13. Act of June 24, 1948, 62 Stat. 604, 612-13, § 6(j).
14. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965).
15. Berman v. United States, 156 F.2d 377 (3d Cir. 1946); United States v. Kauten,
133 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1943).
16. 32 C.F.R. §§ 1622.10, 1622.11, and 1622.14.
17. Act of May 18, 1917, 40 Stat. 76, 78, § 4.
18. In Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366, 389-90 (1918) the Supreme Court stated:
And we pass without anything but statement the proposition that an establishment
of a religion or an interference with the free exercise thereof repugnant to the
First Amendment resulted from the exemption clauses of the act to which we at the
outset referred, because we think its unsoundness is too apparent to require us to
do more.
19. United States v. Seeger, 380 US. 163, 171 (1965).
20. See supra note 17.
21. Clark v. United States, 236 F.2d 13, 23-24 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S.
882 (1956).
22. George v. United States, 196 F.2d 445, 448 (9th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S.
843 (1952).
23. Id. at 449. See generally, In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945).
24. 255 F. Supp. 161 (E.D. Wis. 1966), aff'd, 384 F.2d 905 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 926 (1967).
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(i.e., an individual who objects to participation in a particular war, rather than
to war in any form); Congress had provided that, in order to be entitled to
exemption, conscientious objectors must be opposed to participation in war in
any form. It should be noted that the provisions under consideration in that
-case respecting opposition to participation in any war are identical to the
provisions found in section 6(j) of the Military Selective Service Act of 1967.
To be entitled to exemption as a conscientious objector, the registrant must
demonstrate, first, that he is opposed to participation in war in any form, and
second, that such opposition is a result of his religious training and belief.25
Definitionally, "training" signifies "no more than individual experience support-
ing belief; a mere background against which sincerity could be tested, '20 and
"religious training and belief" has been broadly construed by the Supreme Court
to include "all sincere religious beliefs which are based upon a power or being,
or upon a faith, to which all else is subordinate or upon which all else is ulti-
mately dependent." 27 The statutory exemption does not recognize all forms of
conscientious objection since the congressional definition of "religious training
.and belief" specifically excludes "essentially political, sociological, or philosoph-
ical views, or a merely personal moral code."128 Nevertheless, it is thought
that these categories of conscientious objection should have narrow application.
For example, in United States v. Seeger,20 the Court broadly construed the
-congressional definition of religious training and belief to embrace all religions,
and to exclude political, sociological or philosophical views and personal moral
codes having no religious attributes. As indicated by the Supreme Court, "the
use by Congress of the words 'merely personal' seems to us to restrict the
exception to a moral code which is not only personal but which is the sole basis
for the registrant's belief and is in no way related to a Supreme Being."' "
Association with a particular religious sect, however, is irrelevant to the ques-
tion of eligibility for the exemption. "The ultimate question .. is the sincerity
of the registrant in objection, on religious grounds, to participation in war
in any form."''a  Just as irregular church attendance does not automatically
25. 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (1964).
26. In re Nissen, 146 F. Supp. 361 (D. Mass. 1956).
27. In United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965) the Court stated:
[U]nder the 1940 Act it was necessary only to have a conviction based upon
religious training and belief; we believe that is all that is required here. Within
that phrase would come all sincere religious beliefs which are based upon a power
or being, or upon a faith, to which all else is subordinate or upon which all else
is ultimately dependent. The test might be stated in these words: A sincere and
meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that
filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the exemption comes within
the statutory definition. This construction avoids imputing to Congress an intent
to classify different religious beliefs, exempting some and excluding others, and is
in accord with the well-established congressional policy of equal treatment for
those whose opposition to service is grounded in their religious tenets.
28. 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (1964).
29. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
30. Id. at 186.
31. Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375, 381 (1955).
434
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disqualify a registrant from entitlement to the exemption,82 mere affiliation with'
a particular religious sect does not per se entitle a registrant to conscientious
objector status;.3
The registrant must also be opposed to participation in any war, and it is
not sufficient to espouse opposition to a particular war only. 4 "War," within
section 6(j) of the Act,85 has been defined as "actual military conflicts be-
tween nations of the earth in our time-wars with bombs and bullets, tanks,
planes and rockets." 6 Theocratic wars, therefore, are not considered to be
within the phrase "war in any form," and a person who states that he would
participate in a theocratic war should not, on that basis alone, be denied con-
scientious objector status.87 Moreover, although the willingness of the registrant,
to use force in various situations may be considered by a local Board to be
some evidence of a lack of conscientious objector scruples, the willingness of a
registrant to use force to protect the property of his religion or the lives- or
property of his brethren,38 or to employ self-defense8 9 or to kill in self-defense4"
is not, by itself, sufficient evidence on which to predicate a denial of the
exemption.
Although it may be determined that because of religious training and
belief a registrant is opposed to participation in war in any form, the breadth of
a registrant's exemption from service in the armed forces depends upon the
extent of his opposition to service therein. Even though the registrant is granted
an exemption from combat service as a conscientious objector, he may still
be drafted into the armed forces as a non-combatant if it is determined that
he is not opposed to such service.41 The non-combatant exemption is provided
to those individuals "who are found to be conscientiously opposed to taking
life or active participation in mortal combat, but not to service in support of
others who do engage in combat."42 Therefore, a registrant who is classified as
32. Imboden v. United States, 194 F.2d 508, 513 (6th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 343
U.S. 957 (1951).
33. United States v. Corliss, 280 F.2d 808, 813 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S.
884 (1960); United States v. Simmons, 213 F.2d 901, 904-05 (7th Cir. 1954), rev'd on
other grounds, 348 U.S. 397 (1954); Schuman v. United States, 208 F.2d 801 (9th Cir.
1954).
34. United States v. Kurki, 384 F.2d 905 (7th Cir. 1967); United States v. Kauten,
133 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1943).
35. 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (1964).
36. Sicurella v. United States, 348 U.S. 385, 391 (1955) ; Riles v. United States, 223
F.2d 786 (5th Cir. 1955).
37. Sicurella v. United States, 348 U.S. 385 (1955); Rempel v. United States, 220 F.2d
949 (10th Cir. 1955); United States v. Wilson, 215 F.2d 443 (7th Cir. 1954) ; United States
v. Hertzog, 122 F. Supp. 632 (M.D. Pa. 1954).
38. Sicurella v. United States, 348 U.S. 385 (1955).
39. United States v. Gearey, 379 F.2d 915 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied 389 U.S. 959
(1967).
40. Pitts v. United States, 217 F.2d 590 (9th Cir. 1954).
41. 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (1964) ; Instant case at 910.
42. United States v. Moore, 217 F.2d 428, 433 (7th Cir. 1954), rev'd 6A other grounds,
348 U.S. 966 (1954).
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a non-combatant may be considered for non-combatant service in a combat
zone or elsewhere. 43
It should be noted that the registrant carries the singular burden of demon-
strating to his local Board that he is eligible for and entitled to the exemption.
The Selective Service System regulations make it abundantly clear that a
"registrant who has failed to establish to the satisfaction of the local board ...
that he is eligible for classification in another class" shall be classified I-A.44
In Dickinson v. United States,45 the Supreme Court indicated that "each
registrant must satisfy the Act's rigid criteria for exemption... and since the
. . . exemption is a matter of legislative grace, the selective service registrant
bears the burden of clearly establishing a right to the exemption."
Initially, the court in Sisson assumed for purposes of the opinion that in
time of war Congress has the power to draft the generality of men for combat
service, that this power also includes conscription of a conscientious objector
for some kinds of service in peace or war, and that when the nation must
defend itself against invasion, all persons may be conscripted for combat service.
Against the background of these assumptions, the court considers the question
of whether Congress can compel the combat service of a conscientious objector
in armed international conflict overseas, in the absence of a declaration of war,
when the internal safety and security of the nation is not at stake.46 The Court
determined that Sisson had waited until the administrative process was over to
raise the constitutional challenge to the statute, and noted that Sisson was not
a religious conscientious objector within the congressional definition, 47 that
Sisson never made a claim to such status,48 that the opposition voiced by Sisson
was directed solely toward United States operations in Vietnam.40 With these
facts in mind, the court nevertheless found that Sisson was sincere in his
beliefs,50 that his beliefs were reasonable,5 ' that society has an interest in
protecting the liberty of the conscientious objector, religious or otherwise, -5 2
and that the sense of duty, if authentic, is constitutionally legitimate53 and
therefore subject to the same protections afforded to other recognized interests. 4
Noting that the Supreme Court considers the war powers broad enough to
43. Supra note 41.
44. 32 C.F.R. § 1622.10 (1969). See generally, 32 C.F.R. § 1622.1(c) (1969).
45. 346 US. 389, 395 (1953).
46. This appears to be nearly akin to the question posed by Justices Douglas and
Stewart in Holmes v. United States, 391 U.S. 936 (1968).
47. Instant case at 909.
48. Id. at 904.
49. Id. at 905, 908, 910, 912. This case concerns opposition to a particular war and
not to war in any form. Any other consideration would force the portions of the opinion
directed toward recognition of the legitimacy of selective conscientious objection into pure
obiter dictum. See also United States v. Sisson, 294 F. Supp. 511, 515, 320 (D. Mass. 1968).
50. Instant case at 905.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 908.
53. Id. at 909.
54. Id. at 910.
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compel all citizens to render combat service in the last extremity,55 the court
decided that the last extremity is reached when the country is fighting for, its
very existence, and that the conscientious objector, therefore, is protected
from combat service until the last extremity or something equivalent thereto
is reached. When the public and private interest in the common defense reach
the level5 6 of the last extremity, the public and private interests in individual
liberty should be subordinate. As the Vietnam type conflict does not approach
anything near the "last extremity,"5 7 and since the national need for combat
service is slight in relation to the public interest in individual liberty,58 the
court reasoned that the free exercise of religion clause of the first amendment
and the due process clause of the fifth amendment prohibit compelled combat
service from Sisson in the Vietnam conflict. Acknowledging that on appeal the
Supreme Court might deal only with the issue of the constitutionality of the
draft provisions regarding the religious conscientious objector exemption,59 the
court explicitly found that the exemption is unconstitutional due to its dis-
crimination in favor of religious conscientious objectors. Since, by a prior find-
ing,60 a non-religious conscientious objector should be accorded the same recog-
nition by Congress as a religious conscientious objector, the recognition by
Congress of conscientious objection on religious basis only is an unconstitutional
discrimination in violation of the "free exercise of religion" clause of the first
amendment.61
Sisson establishes three important new points of law, each of which is
contrary to a long history of judicial precedent: 62 that there is a constitutional
restriction prohibiting compelled combat service from conscientious objectors
under certain circumstances; that there is an equality between religious and non-
religious conscientious objectors; and that selective conscientious objection
is legitimate. Should the Supreme Court adopt these new points of law, the
war powers of Congress will not be as broad as they have previously been con-
strued to be. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the Supreme Court may not
reach the conclusions of law advanced by Sisson, but may choose to fashion its
55. United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 623-24 (1931), per Mr. Justice Suther-
land. The Court stated therein:
The conscientious objector is relieved from the obligation to bear arms in obedience
to no constitutional provision, express or implied; but because, and only because,
it has accorded with the policy of Congress thus to relieve him.... [Tihe war
powers . . . include . . . the power, in the laWt extremity, to compel the armed
service of any citizen in the land, without regard to his objections or his views in
respect of the justice or iorality of the particular war or of war in general.
(Emphasis added.)
56. Instant case at 908. The Court states therein: "Those rival categories of claims
cannot be mathematically graded. There is no table of weights and measures. Yet there
is no insuperable difficulty in distinguishing orders of magnitude."
57. Id. at 909.
58. Id.
59. 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (1964).
60. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
61. Instant case at 911.
62. See supra notes 2, 3, 10, 15, 17-24 and accompanying text.
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remedy so as to avoid the issue of constitutionality, a course the Sisson court
might have followed.
It may be questionable whether the court in Sisson should have proceeded
as far as it did in arriving at its decision, since, contrary to the statement of the
court, it appears that Sisson failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Al-
though the court referred to exhaustion of administrative remedies, this refer-
ence was in relation only to the fact that Sisson waited until the administrative
process was over to raise the contention that the statute was unconstitutionally
discriminatory. 63 In selective service cases, only exhaustion of administrative
remedies is usually held to be acceptable.
Generally speaking, a registrant is required to exhaust his administrative
remedies before raising, in court, the contention that his classification is invalid.
The exhaustion doctrine provides that "no one is entitled to judicial relief for a
supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has
been exhausted."6 4 The primary purpose of this doctrine is to allow for the
smooth and orderly operation of the administrative agency. The Supreme Court
has indicated that
the agency, like a trial court, is created for the purpose of applying
a statute in the first instance. Accordingly, it is normally desirable
to let the agency develop the necessary factual background upon
which decisions should be based. And since agency decisions are fre-
quently of a discretionary nature or frequently require expertise,
the agency should be given the first chance to exercise that discretion
or to apply that expertise.65
This discretion or expertise has limitations, however, and an administrative
agency is usually thought to be incapable of deciding the constitutionality of the
statute from which it derives its authority to act.66 Additionally, a number of
courts have been unwilling to require exhaustion where the local Board denied
a registrant procedural rights,6 7 or where there was no pressing national
emergency compelling limited judicial review of a registrant's classification.6"
The reluctance to compel strict exhaustion of administrative remedies in all
instances has been announced by the courts69 and noted by legal scholarsY°
There are, however, several areas of the law in which the Supreme Court is
63.- Instant case at 906.
64. Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938).
65. McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185 at 193-94 (1969). The McKart case was
decided after the Sisson decision was handed down, and may provide some indication of
the Supreme Court's present disposition toward exhaustion of administrative remedies.
66. Public Utilities Comm'n of State of California v. United States, 355 U.S. 534,
539 (1958). Cf. Mr. Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion in Hart v. United States, 391 U.S.
956, 960 (1968).
67. Townsend v. Zimmerman, 237 F.2d 376 (6th Cir. 1956).
68. Ex Parte Fabiani, 105 F. Supp. 139 (E.D. Pa. 1952).
69. McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185 (1969).
70. 3 K. DAvis, AD rnsRAr=v LAW §§ 20.01, 20.06 (1958 with 1965 Supp.); Layton
and Fine, The Draft and Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies, 56 GEo. L.J. 315, 320-31
(1967).
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willing to apply the exhaustion doctrine much more strictly. Within the Selec-
tive Service law, the Court has indicated that claims for deferments for those
engaged in activities deemed necessary to the maintenance of the national
health, safety, or interest, and claims for conscientious objection exemption
"would appear to be examples of questions requiring the application of ex-
pertise or the exercise of discretion," 71 and therefore requiring exhaustion of
available administrative remedies. To assist a registrant in exhausting the
available administrative remedies, provision is made within the framework of
the Selective Service System for appeals 72 by a registrant from a particular
classification, and, while appeal from a classification is being taken, induction
is suspended.73
Against this apparent requirement for exhaustion and the provision of
means to effect exhaustion, Sisson presents one fact distinguishing it from all
other important cases in this area, namely, an apparent failure to utilize any of
the available administrative remedies to obtain a change in classification. In
Falbo v. United States,74 Estep v. United States,75 Seeger,76 and McKart v.
United States,7 7 each petitioner had utilized the administrative machinery in a
positive attempt to alter his classification. In Sisson, however, except for a
letter to his local board,78 Sisson failed to make use of any of the administrative
remedies available to him. The contention raised by Sisson was that the Act,
as applied to him, violated "the provision of the First Amendment that 'Con-
gress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof.' ",79 However, the Sisson opinion is completely devoid
of any indication of the manner in which the section, later held to be uncon-
stitutionally discriminatory, was applied to Sisson. It appears that what Sisson
asked the court to do was to declare unconstitutional that which may have
denied him conscientious objector exemption, not that which in fact did. This
request seems to lack rationality, for before there can be a denial of equal
treatment under the law, one would logically expect that there has first been
some form of denial. Because a statute may be applied in various ways, to
declare an Act of Congress unconstitutional as written would be to render an
opinion advisory in nature. In other words, the complaint "is merely that
officials of the executive department of the government are executing and will
71. McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 198 (1969) (esp. notes 15 and 16 therein).
72. 32 C.F.R. parts 1626 and 1627 (1969).
73. See 32 C.F.R. §§ 1624.3, 1625.14, 1626.41, and 1627.8 (1969).
74. 320 U.S. 549 (1944).
75. 327 U.S. 114 (1946).
76. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
77. 395 U.S. 185 (1969).
78. Instant case at 904-05. Presumably, Sisson also informed his local Board of his
change of address, pursuant to 32 C.F.R. § 16413. This act would no more change Sisson's
classification in any formal sense than would requesting a form "so thatI might make my
claim as a conscientious objector." Neither act has any relation to exhaustion of adminis-
trative remedies.
79. Instant case at 911.
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execute an act of Congress asserted to be unconstitutional; and [the court
was] asked to prevent [this]. To do so would be not to decide a judicial con-
troversy, but to assume a position of authority over the governmental acts of
another and co-equal department, an authority which plainly [the courts] do
not possess."8 0 It appears, therefore, that the court should have developed the
factual basis of exhaustion of administrative remedies more fully, or it should
have remanded the case to Sisson's local Board for a determination of Sisson's
eligibility for conscientious objector exemption.
Even absent a consideration of exhaustion of administrative remedies, the
court in Sisson should have attempted to construe section 6(j) of the Military
Selective Service Act of 196781 so as to maintain its constitutionality.8 2 By so
doing, the court may have been able to afford a remedy similar to that which
was provided, and still maintain a close relationship with past judicial precedent.
In United States v. Seeger,83 the Supreme Court utilized this technique to
exempt several registrants from the draft and avoid the contention that the
conscientious objector provisions of the draft act then in force were invalid. At
the time of that case "religious training and belief" was defined to mean "an
individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to
those arising from any human relation, but [did] not include essentially polit-
ical, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code."8 4
Although the petitioners in Seeger believed in a "Supreme Reality" or a "uni-
versal power" rather than in a "Supreme Being" as required by the provisions
of the act, the Court construed Supreme Being broadly enough to embrace the
petitioners' beliefs.8 5 And in so doing, the Court construed political, sociological
or philosophical views or merely personal moral codes, excluded by Congress
from the definition of religious training and belief, to be those views and
personal moral codes having no relation to a Supreme Being.80 By broadly
construing the phrase "Supreme Being" and narrowly construing those views
specifically excluded from the definition of religious training and belief the
Court was able to provide exemption from the draft without declaring the
conscientious objector provisions to be invalid. In Sisson, however, it appears
that the court completely disregarded this technique in making its determination
of the validity of section 6(j) of the present act. Nevertheless, the court in
Sisson may have been able to uphold section 6(j) by broadly construing the
phrase "religious training and belief" in much the same manner that the
Supreme Court in Seeger construed "Supreme Being," and by narrowly constru-
80. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 US. 447, 488-89 (1923).
81. 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (1964).
82. See Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine oj Constitutional Law,
7 HARv. L. REv. 129 (1893); F. FRANxm-ERu , LAW AND PoLlncs 25 (paperback ed. 1962);
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 341 (1936) (concurring opinion of
Mr. Justice Brandeis).
83. 380 US. 163 (1965).
84. Act of June 24, 1948, ch. 625, 62 Stat. 604, 612-13, § 6(j).
85. 380 U.S. at 176. See also concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas at 188.
86. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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ing the specifically excluded views as having no relation to religion. Had the
court thereafter determined that Sisson's belief had some relation to religion,
even though minor, Sisson's belief would be within the congressional definition
of religion, Sisson could have been afforded exemption from the draft, and the
exemption's constitutionality would have been upheld. By utilizing such a
procedure, the court may have been able to avoid "imputing to Congress an
intent to classify different religious beliefs, exempting some and excluding
others, and [would have been] in accord with the well-established congressional
policy of equal treatment for those whose opposition to service is grounded in
their religious tenets."8 7
Because the Supreme Court may choose, on appeal, not to adopt the new
points of law developed in Sisson, the method the court chose to exempt Sisson
from the draft may have provided relief of a temporary nature only, and a
remedy which is tenuous at best. It is apparent, therefore, that the court should
have made an overt attempt to construe the provisions of section 6(j) of the
Act so as to include Sisson within the section's coverage. While it is true that
the court may have found that Sisson's convictions had no basis whatsoever in
religion, in making that determination alone the court would have made an
attempt to uphold the validity of the statute, and would have explored every
route available in fashioning its remedy.
DAVID A. HIGLEY
TAXATION-SriPENDs GIVEN IN CONJUNCTION'WITH EMPLOYER Doc-
TORAL PROGRAMS ARE TAxABLE AS COMPENSATION FOR EMPLOYMENT
Respondents, Johnson, et. al.,' received stipends (which were originally
included in their gross income for the years 1961-1962) from their employer,
Westinghouse, while they were completing dissertations for doctoral degrees.
Such stipends constituted the second phase of a two-part program known as
the Westinghouse Bettis Fellowship and Doctoral Program.2 The payments
from Westinghouse were based on a specified percentage of respondents'
87. United States v. Seeger, 380 US. 163, 176 (1965).
1. Respondents were Richard E. Johnson, Richard A. Wolfe, and Martin L. Pomerantz,
all engineers at the Bettis Atomic Power Laboratory and employed by Westinghouse. Their
wives were parties to the action merely because joint tax returns were filed for the years
in question.
2. This program was a two-phase schedule of subsidized post-graduate study in
engineering, physics, or mathematics. The first phase was a "work-study" concept with the
employee being paid for a forty-hour week and receiving up to eight hours off for the
purpose of attending classes. When an employee completed all preliminary requirements
for his doctorate he could apply for an educational leave of absence, which constituted the
second phase, to complete work on his doctoral dissertation. The employee was required
to submit a proposed dissertation topic for approval by Westinghouse and the Atomic
Energy Commission. Approval was based, inter alia, on a determination that the topic had
at least some general relevance to the work done at Bettis.
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